thong, /ay/, that they associated with islander identity, and they simply extended their fondness for centralized onsets into the new linguistic environment-where, in fact, it had existed historically. But that explanation cries out for a more fundamental one: why did much of the rest of the English-speaking world lose the centralized onsets in /ay/ and /aw/ that were preserved in Martha's Vineyard? For that matter, why did the Great Vowel Shift take place? Why is the Northern Cities Shift taking place in the northern cities and not in, say, Atlanta? Even if we can demonstrate that linguistic changes may sometimes or in part originate in particular social and functional causes, why these particular shifts? Why there? Why now? Why any change at all?
The inadequacy of the social answer to such questions is further highlighted by the often-subconscious nature of phonological change. As Labov and others have demonstrated repeatedly, speakers are often relatively unaware of change in progress until it has been completed. People do not say to themselves things like, "Hey, it would really help us differentiate the sexes in Philadelphia if all the guys would increase the vocalization of /l/ and pronounce, say, [lIto] more frequently, leaving [lItEl] for the gals."
It is important to note that the question that I am asking is fundamentally different from the important theoretical question about what constraints "may exist on the form, direction, or structural character of linguistic change" (Labov 1994, 115) . For example, given that sound change exists, what are its possible forms? (For example, "In chain shifts, peripheral vowels become more open and nonperipheral vowels become less open" [Labov 1994, 601] .) More specifically, Labov poses questions such as the following: given a particular vowel system, what are the possible changes that it could undergo? What changes would be impossible?
Traditionally, the answer that linguists have given to the actuation question is primarily functional. In this view, psychologically deterministic causes initiate linguistic change, for example, the hypothesis that chain shifts result from "the dialectic opposition between the cognitive demand for symmetry and the asymmetrical physiology of the supraglottal tract" (Labov 1994, 218; cf. Martinet 1952 cf. Martinet , 1955 . 1 Others have attempted to relate actuation to enhancement of intelligibility, hypothesizing that people tend to select pronunciations (and linguistic forms and constructions) that they find are more readily understood by their hearers. As Labov (1994, 218-21, 551-52) convincingly demonstrates, such psychological theories as these do not in general seem to be strongly supported by the actual data of phonological change, though he does not completely rule out such "mechanical" explanations (e.g., perhaps long vowels tend to rise and short vowels tend to fall because "in pronouncing a long vowel, speakers tend to overshoot the target, whereas in pronouncing a short vowel, they tend to undershoot" [Labov 1994, 221] ). For Labov, however, there seems to be little that can be said about actuation except that it arises in some combination of the social and the functional:
Something must be said about the distinction which is often drawn between the "origin" and the "propagation" of a change. . . . I do not find such a distinction coherent. What is the origin of a linguistic change? Clearly not the act of some one individual whose tongue slips, or who slips into an odd habit of his own. We define language . . . as an instrument used by the members of the community to communicate with one another. Idiosyncratic habits are not a part of language so conceived, and idiosyncratic changes no more so. Therefore we can say that the language has changed only when a group of speakers use a different pattern to communicate with each other. . . . The origin of a change is its "propagation" or acceptance by others. (Labov 1972, 277) Eighty years ago, Sapir (1921, 155) attempted to confront the issues of actuation in his concept of language drift, which he viewed as the tendency of every language to change 2 in a certain direction, just as only certain wave movements in the bay outline the tide. The drift of a language is constituted by the unconscious selection on the part of its speakers of those individual variations that are cumulative in some special direction. This direction may be inferred, in the main, from the past history of the language. . . . As we look about us and observe current usage, it is not likely to occur to us that our language has a "slope," that the changes of the next few centuries are in a sense prefigured in certain obscure tendencies of the present and that these changes, when consummated, will be seen to be but continuations of changes that have already been effected. Sapir (1921, 154) explicitly rejects the notion that drift is a "mystical" concept or a mere teleological anthropomorphism by which he is imputing to language "a power to change of its own accord over and above the involuntary tendency of individuals to vary the norm." Yet while Sapir rejects mystical explanations, he also appears unable to believe that random variability could play any significant role:
What significant changes take place in [language] must exist, to begin with, as individual variations . . . and yet it by no means follows that the general drift of language can be understood from an exhaustive descriptive study of these variations alone. They themselves are random phenomena (not ultimately random, of course, only relatively so), like the waves of the sea, moving backward and forward in purposeless flux. The linguistic drift has direction. In other words, only those individual variations embody it or carry it which move in a certain direction. (155) That is to say, the "random" nature of "individual variations" by itself can lead only to stasis ("purposeless flux"), not patterned change. On the other hand, "linguistic drift has direction," the cause of which is seemingly not evident.
Unlike Sapir, Labov (1963, 273-74) has little to say about "random" phenomena and "purposeless" flux except that they exist. In discussing "mergers and push chains," he says, "it is not hard to deduce that [they] are mutually exclusive alternatives. What we do not know at present is why one route is followed rather than the other" (Labov 1991, 36 ). Labov's "at present" suggests that a principled (and, it would seem, broadly speaking, functionalist) explanation should eventually be forthcoming. Elsewhere, however, Labov (1991, 38-39 ) takes a dimmer view: "We would not reasonably hope to explain why each region began shifting along the path that it did."
In the end, Sapir's (1921) concept of drift, if explicitly not "mystical," seems to be thoroughly "mechanical" (Labov's word for functional). For the next fifteen pages of Language, Sapir presents in detail a thoroughly functionalist-and generally convincing-set of explanations for various specific morphological changes in English (e.g., the disappearance of whom in favor of a leveled who). Sapir also suggests that the inception lies in a set of imprecisely understood functionalist causes: "We cannot even begin to ferret out and discuss all the psychological problems that are concealed behind these bland tables [showing vowel changes in English and German for singular and plural foot and mouse]" (179-80, italics added). However, the chapter following, on phonological change, tends in expression to be somewhat more enigmatic: "More often . . . the phonetic drift is not so much a movement towards a particular set of sounds as toward particular types of articulation" (181). Such independently similar changes cannot, Sapir believes, have been accidental: "They are rooted in a common, pre-dialectic drift" (180) that is somehow built into the structure of languages themselves and is the source of the "involuntary tendency of individuals to vary the norm" (154). What we do not understand is what constitutes the "somehow." Sapir (1921, 147) , much more than most of his contemporaries, was keenly aware of an aspect of language that we associate normally only with later twentiethcentury sociolinguistics:
Language is variable. Two individuals of the same generation and locality, speaking precisely the same dialect and moving in the same social circles, are never absolutely at one in their speech habits. A minute investigation of the speech of each individual would reveal countless differences of detail. . . . In a sense they speak slightly divergent dialects of the same language rather than identically the same language.
Sapir's remarkable awareness of variability could not go much further than this, however, because unavailable to him were two key insights that have emerged only within the past thirty years or so. First, thanks to the advent of spectrographic analysis and Labovian sociolinguistics, we know that intraindividual linguistic "free" variation is as extensive and important as interindividual variation. Some of this variation correlates with context of utterance. Some of it is phonologically conditioned. Some of it doubtless is the product of functional factors. But some of it must also be the result of sheer chance: sometimes one's tongue slides in one place, and sometimes one's tongue slides into a slightly different place. Sometimes we round our lips strongly in pronouncing the vowel in on, and sometimes we don't.
Well, so what? As Sapir (1921) tells us, chance is "like the waves of the sea, moving backward and forward in purposeless flux." But this is right only in a sense. The second insight that we possess, but that was unavailable to Sapir, stems frombroadly speaking-contemporary chaos theory. Schneider (1997) summarizes the findings of chaos theory and draws correlations with various aspects of linguistics. Of particular relevance to the issue of language change is what Schneider describes as the butterfly effect, technically defined as "sensitive dependence on initial conditions" (Gleick 1977:23) . The central idea is that small fluctuations of a structure are amplified in time, at some point beyond a critical order, and thus this development causes the system to collapse and transfer to a new system. [E.g., a butterfly wing beating in the air in Brazil may ultimately culminate in a tornado in Kansas.] . . . That obviously sounds like what we know about the actuation of linguistic change: In language evolution, we have seemingly random, and insignificant, variation, which at some point becomes systematic, begins to spread, and typically will be subconsciously or consciously loaded with some socially signalling function. . . . Lightfoot (1991: 165) suggested that in linguistics the butterfly effect corresponds to a "constant, chaotic flux in the linguistic environment" which in the long run, at some point, causes "a new parameter setting." (26) Though Lightfoot (1991) does not develop the point further, he is onto a crucial insight here. That is to say, though "flux" must indeed be (as Sapir rightly says) "purposeless," it need not be cumulatively static (contrary to Sapir's apparent belief). Rather, random chance can in itself produce patterned results if (a) it operates over a large enough set of events and/or (b) there is an interrelatedness among the events such that the output of one instance can affect the next instance.
3 On the whole, (c) one would also expect such outcomes to be relatively rare.
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In human language-particularly in phonology-(a), (b), and (c) are clearly the case. The set of events is huge: any speaker (of English, for example) will utter the phonemes of the language countless times per day. There are millions of speakers of English. The events are interactive: each time each speaker speaks, other community members will normally hear him or her. Crucially, speakers are influenced by other speakers, so that each utterance may have some sort of psychological effect on listeners. Finally, as Macaulay (1988, 156-57) points out, change is, in fact, relatively rare: "Languages are, in fact, remarkably stable organisms, transmitting their essential characteristics from one generation to the next. This stability is all the more remarkable given the variability of children's language."
If, as Sapir (1921) believed, individual linguistic variation were fully "random," then there would indeed usually be little if any nonfunctional variation over time because the random variations would tend to average each other out. But, unlike Sapir, we know that this is not the case: chaotic systems are not necessarily static systems; linguistic variation is intrapersonal as well as interpersonal; interaction between speakers can eventually prevent variations from averaging each other out. A rough analogy may clarify this point: ninety-nine coins thrown into the air have the same chance of landing all-tails the thousandth time they are tossed as they have the first. However, if we toss the ninety-nine coins in the air several billion times, chances are better that there will be some sequences of tosses in which all, or nearly all, of the coins will come up tails. If we continue the process long enough, there will even be some sequences of tosses that will produce a surprising number of heads on each toss. When this happens, it may appear to the tosser that something other than mere chance is in control, even if it is not. That is to say, a pattern will emerge, even though there is no cause other than sheer chance.
Of course, under fully random conditions, such chance-induced "patterns" will be quite rare, and they will have little lasting consequence (any more than, say, a sequence of jackpots in a normal slot machine will have any consequences for the next time the handle is pulled). However, there will indeed be consequences if we weight the probability on each toss slightly in favor of the results of the previous toss. For example, if on our first toss the ninety-nine coins come up forty-nine heads and fifty tails, on the second toss we could reserve one coin as already a "tails" and toss only the other ninety-eight. Moreover, we could then reevaluate our weighting in this manner each time we tossed the coins, so that the more "tails" (or "heads") that came up, the heavier the weighting for "tails" (or "heads"). Using such a program, we will pass through many different configurations of heads and tails, but in the end, we will eventually generate "tails" (or "heads") categorically every time we toss. (If a casino added this feature to its slot machines, eventually all the slot machines would never pay anything at all, or they would pay off a jackpot of one coin each time a coin was put into them.) Such a schema does indeed describe human language. Speakers do literally toss their phonemes and morphemes and lexical items and syntactic structures into the air. The actualizations of each linguistic toss contain numerous variable elements. Some of the variation we know to be functional, and some is conditioned. But some must certainly be random; if so, in the course of multitudes of utterances in a speech community, accidental patterns will occur. And for human beings, who are not simply random language generators isolated from each other, these patterns will eventually form some of the basis for the next multitude of utterances. People-particularly those in the years-long process of learning language for the first time-are inclined to modify their speech in the direction of the speech that is going on around them, and if the pattern of what they are hearing changes, they will tend to follow. Sapir (1921) was so puzzled by "language drift" because he seems to have conceptualized human beings as like simple slot machines and the role of probability in linguistic variability as being like the chance arrangement of lemons, cherries, and diamonds that appear each time a normal slot machine is played. He was almost right: the fundamental actuating mechanism of linguistic change is pure chancebut not chance in the simple static sense that Sapir understood it. When the people in a community have produced a phoneme (or other linguistic unit) a sufficient number of times, the random fluctuations in pronunciation (or other form) will themselves form a randomly generated pattern of variation that acts as the new input for the next set of random fluctuations. The weighted penny-toss schemacombined with social and functional causes-produces precisely the sort of fluctuations in change that characterize linguistic variation.
Additional support for the notion of drift that I am putting forth here grows out of studies comparing linguistic evolution with the Darwinian theory of evolution. McMahon (1994, 337) summarizes, If we accept that variation arises randomly, how can it be that change is predominantly regular, and successive stages of languages are ordered and systematic? We may be able to account for this apparent paradox by borrowing a further idea from biology, since " 'Chance in combination with selection produces order' is one of the axioms of evolutionary methodology" (Stevick 1963: 165) . This axiom would help us solve out problem of perceived directionality, for which teleological explanations have previously been proposed. Perceived directionality is accepted in current evolutionary theory as resulting from random variation and natural selection, which combine to produce order with no necessary external direction: an accumulation of historical accidents may still look like a conspiracy.
Butters / Chance as Cause of Variation and Change 207
The difference, of course, is that in classical evolutionary theory, changes tend to survive because they are functional and not merely because they have happened before.
Still further support for my notions of actuation and drift is found in Rudi Keller's (1994) provocative book, On Language Change: The Invisible Hand in Language. Keller's "invisible hand" and Sapir's (1921) "language drift" seem conceptually very close, though Keller does attempt to distinguish his theory from that of Sapir. Importantly, Keller moves beyond Sapir in examining social-variable explanations, one of which is summarized in a maxim that partly underlies the chance/ chaos model developed above: "Talk like the people around you" (100). Keller draws on the work of Jules Levin, who in an unpublished essay (1988) attempted a computer modeling of linguistic change that illustrates very well how chance coupled with interactional affect leads to patterned change:
It is Levin's goal to model the distribution of variants over a certain territory. The existence of two variants is presupposed as given. As an 'area,' he chooses a square grid containing, for example, 55 × 55 unit fields. Each field has been allocated a certain value, 'black' or 'white.' The distribution of the values across the whole 'area' is initially random. . . . Levin developed a computer program which simulates a certain interaction between the two variants. The value of each field can stay constant or change, depending on the value of the adjoining fields. Every field which is not at the border of the grid has eight neighboring fields (including the diagonally adjoining ones). The program should roughly simulate the maxim 'Talk like the people around you.' A randomly chosen field, let us say a black one, has a certain chance of remaining black or becoming white, depending on how many of the eight neighboring fields are also black (or white). According to Levin's algorithm, a field surrounded by eight fields of equal value can have this value in the next run, whereas a white field that is surrounded by four white and four black fields has a 51 percent chance of staying white. The result of this simulation is astonishing. After only a relatively few number of runs, a structure starts to emerge which is bafflingly similar to a map of isoglosses. . . . This structure is smoothed out in the following runs and soon becomes stable. It still remained stable after 10,000 repetitions. (100-1) "Needless to say," Keller (1988) comments, "such a model is a far cry from a 'realistic' model of language change" (101). In fact, however, such a model is a highly realistic analog for the fundamental process of linguistic change: chance affected by social attraction (i.e., the inclination to speak like those who have been speaking to us). Although the results appear "astonishing" and "baffling" at first, they are in fact inevitable.
In a recent series of articles and conference papers, Peter Trudgill and his research associates have also begun to examine the major importance of chance in linguistic change. In a conference address that drew on two as-yet unpublished papers (Trudgill et al. , 1999b , Trudgill (1999b) described a model of linguistic change that is "something akin to Sapir's notion of 'drift' "-a "probabilistic solution to the problem of randomness in the transmission of dialect features from one generation to another in dialect mixture and new-dialect formation situations" (Trudgill et al. 1999a, 1) . Citing the leveling of a number of historical linguistic features in New Zealand English, the authors note that for linguistic feature after linguistic feature, where two or more variants were present in the English of the first settlers of New Zealand, the feature that disappeared was the feature that represented the speech of the minority of the original settlers. For example,
[word-initial] /h/-dropping . . . does not survive in New Zealand English in spite of the fact that it is the norm in vernacular varieties in London and everywhere else in the southeast of England. . . . The Irish, Scottish, Northumbrian, (partial) West Country, and East Anglian /h/-pronouncing variants were in the majority in the mixture [of original settlers] and have won out in modern New Zealand English. (Trudgill et al. 1999a, 8) The chance/chaos model I have developed in this article also predicts that majority features would usually win out, but not always. Trudgill et al. (1999a) note with some puzzlement that occasionally a minority feature prevailed-for example, a majority of settlers would have distinguished between schwa [E] and barred-i [I] in final unstressed syllables, thus contrasting, for example, roses and Rosa's. However, this distinction is absent in modern New Zealand speech (Trudgill et al. 1999a, 10) . The authors are at pains to explain this seeming deviation from probability on the basis of markedness theory. Without completely ruling out the possible relevance of their explanation, one wonders why they do not invoke markedness in the other cases as well! At any rate, the notion of probability that I have developed here would predict that at least some minority linguistic features would win out, just as, occasionally, someone hits the jackpot on slot machines.
Similarly, Trudgill et al. (1999a, 4) note that a widespread 19th-century British feature which is absent from [19th-century New Zealand English] is the merger of /v/ and /w/ as /w/, giving village as willage, which was a feature of many south-of-England dialects at this time. . . . This did make it into a number of other colonial varieties such as those of Tristan da Cunha (see Schreier, forthcoming) and the Bahamas, presumably because of the earlier date of formation of these varieties.
But if the merger of /v/ and /w/ is a "widespread 19th-century British feature," one would expect that exactly the opposite would be the case (i.e., the feature would be more likely to occur in New Zealand than in Tristan da Cunha or the Bahamas, not less! The fact that it seemingly never occurred in New Zealand but does occur in Tristan da Cunha and the Bahamas is not, however, evidence against a probabilistic model. On the contrary, properly understood within the framework of a chance/ chaos model, such occasional seeming anomalies are not only possible but inevitable. Again, this is not to deny the relevance of ideology and linguistic attitudes, which in themselves can act to reweigh variables through public education or ethnic, gender, or intergenerational stereotyping-as Trudgill et al. (1999a, 14) agree. It is not inconceivable that such social reweighting took place in New Zealand and not in Tristan da Cunha or the Bahamas with respect to the merger /v/ and /w/. Obviously, it is necessary to seek out functional causes and social motivations wherever they may be plausibly advanced. However, even functional and social factors are subject to probabilistic determinism. For example, Trudgill (1999a) demonstrates how certain stigmatized features (e.g., the merger /v/ and /w/ in Norfolk) retain their salience even after they have entirely disappeared from the vernacular, whereas others are not salient (e.g., the now-defunct pronunciations of thread and shriek as /trId/ and /sri:k/). Why, he wonders, are these particular features selected for such social prominence? Trudgill merely poses the question; he does not answer it. However, in terms of the model developed here, there need be no other explanation than chance/chaos.
Trudgill only in passing connects these issues with Sapir's notion of drift: the relationship is not discussed in the two papers that I have seen to date (Trudgill 1999a; Trudgill et al. 1999a ). Trudgill et al.'s work (1999b) is as yet available by title only (I know about it only because it is referenced in his list of sources for Trudgill et al. 1999a) . The abstract for Trudgill (1999b) (a conference presentation that I heard him deliver but have not seen a printed version of) says only that the probabilistic model espoused in Trudgill et al. (1999a) "may, in addition, be due to something akin to Sapir's notion of 'drift': varieties may resemble one another because, having derived from some common source, they continue to evolve linguistically in similar directions as a result of linguistic change even after separation." As noted above, the explanation for identical changes in daughter dialects that have been separated from each other since before the change took place may have functional explanations. For example, the loss of phonemic /h/ in various English dialects might be "explained" in part by the fact that /h/ was such a marginal phoneme in the first place (i.e., it is at best phonemic only in initial positions). Similarly, the vocalization of /l/ may be "explained" in part by pan-English aspects of the language-learning process. It is not clear, however, that-once functional factors are accounted for-Trudgill sees "drift" as any less mysterious a process than Sapir does. That is to say, when Trudgill (1999b) writes that these are not "haphazard processes," he appears to mean that linguistic change has functional and social explanations-together with "something akin to Sapir's notion of 'drift.' " In fact, I here maintain that "probability" and "drift" are one and the same.
There is nothing mystical about linguistic change, not even phonological change. Given that individual speech is marked by patterned variability and that individuals influence each other, it would only be very surprising if language did not change, given the very large amount of talk that is produced every generation in the life of a speech community. Indeed, it would be impossible for language not to change-it must change, and it must do so in patterns of regular variability. Notes 1. Among other things, such a theory leaves unexplained why humans should desire symmetry in their vowels and why, if satisfactory symmetry is impossible to achieve, humans should nonetheless continue to pursue it.
2. See Keiser (2001) for a survey of the literature on Sapir and drift since 1921. 3. I write "and/or" because, as every elementary statistician knows, sometimes chance will cause seeming patterns that are themselves merely random results. Such arguments have often been given to discredit the results of parapsychology testing. If, for example, I ask a large number of people to guess the identity of a succession of face-down playing cards, a predictably few subjects will on occasion get a very large number of "right" answers that will make it seem as though they have unusual mental powers, even if they don't.
4. As Kroch (1989) points out, the complex natural phenomena of evolution and genetic change offer parallels to the process of linguistic change. The seemingly random fluctuations in the gene pool do indeed produce functionalist patterned change through weighting-that is, those genetic changes that enhance survival are preserved. Moreover, there are also patterned changes that appear to have no real survival value (in humans, blue eye color, perhaps, or baldness). In a simple model, such features would triumph if something caused them to be "weighted" (e.g., a social or aesthetic preference for blue-eyed, bald mates). Genetic change, however, is obviously complicated in ways that language change is not, given such features as dominance and recessiveness, the multitudinous differences between the sex act and the speaking process, and that genetic mutation has various causes and manifestations that offer no ready parallel in human language.
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